Failed asylum seekers
Why failed asylum seekers should have a conditional right to stay
This article aims to reconcile the moral rights of failed asylum seekers with the integrity of the asylum system. Can the state grant failed asylum seekers a right to stay without undermining the core purpose of the refugee system? Can the state sometimes return those whose asylum claim has failed without violating their moral rights? The article argues that restricting the rights of asylum seekers and reducing the length of the asylum process raise ethical concerns and practical problems. It emphasizes that liberal states should charitably interpret the norms of international protection. It proposes to extend the right to stay on social membership grounds qualified by a good faith condition, and limit returns to those that have lodged their claim in bad faith. Engaging with the good/bad faith distinction the article aims to counteract a culture of suspicion towards asylum seekers by clarifying what it really means to launch a claim in bad faith and to realign its scope in a morally appropriate way.
“While I agree with the implication of Hadj Abdou and Kollar’s proposal – expanding the grounds for a right to stay within the asylum system – I take issue with their preferred solution of introducing a ‘good faith’ assessment. It seems to me that it would be far less arbitrary to expand the grounds for a right to stay and lower the standard of proof for meeting those grounds, rather than appealing to the attitudes of applicants. Hadj Abdou and Kollar acknowledge that asylum systems are marred by a ‘culture of suspicion’, but I think they understate the risk of their proposal further contributing to such culture and the harms that it already causes. The response piece focuses on explicating this worry.”
“In response to Leila Hadj Abdou and Eszter Kollar’s rich and insightful piece, I focus on two main points. First, I question their central claim that the normative attitudes of asylum seekers towards the refugee system can be significant enough to outweigh the social membership based-right to remain. I distinguish between three cases – bad faith, good faith, and the absence of normative attitudes—and argue that in each instance, normative attitudes do not appear to be as normatively significant as Hadj Abdou and Kollar suggest. Second, I examine the implications of their view for how states deal with irregular migration before migrants even arrive, particularly in immigrant selection practices. I argue that this reveals the difficulties of distinguishing between good and bad faith normative attitudes in a morally just way.” Read the response.