Migration blackmail
Can states resist migration blackmail while protecting migrants?
Migration blackmail occurs when one state threatens to engineer a “migration crisis” on the borders of a target state by creating or permitting an irregular migration flow unless political or economic concessions are made by the target state. States may have legitimate interests in resisting migration blackmail.
However, migrants have strong interests in accessing international protection and avoiding harm. These goals may seem to stand in tension and generate a dilemma: it may seem that there is no way for target states to effectively resist and deter blackmail while adequately respecting migrants’ interests.
This paper explores what is problematic about migration blackmail and how states may permissibly respond to it. I argue that target states are not permitted to close their borders in response to migration blackmail but instead must respect the right to seek asylum. I offer four complementary arguments for this conclusion: (1) not all cases of migration blackmail are dilemmatic; (2) target states have often contributed to the circumstances that give rise to migration blackmail and so may bear some responsibility for the situation; (3) the interests of migrants in accessing protection and avoiding harm outweigh states’ interests in resisting blackmail; and (4) states have options available to resist migration blackmail without contravening the right to asylum.
“My response to Daniel Sharp broadly endorses his critique of state responses to migration blackmail (also known as the ‘instrumentalisation of migrants’), while also arguing that his framework underplays three important dimensions. First, migrants subjected to ‘instrumentalisation’ retain agency and should not be reduced to pawns in a geopolitical struggle. Second, many state responses are not only immoral but also unlawful, undermining core human rights and the rule of law within the EU, thereby strengthening Sharp’s argument. Third, while national security considerations do not undermine Sharp’s overall conclusion, I believe that these considerations—particularly in relation to openly hostile states such as Russia and Belarus engaging in migration blackmail—require careful integration into the analysis. By drawing attention to these three issues, my contribution seeks to deepen and extend the analysis, encouraging further reflection and dialogue.”
“Migration blackmail involves states neighbouring the Global North threatening to let migrants pass through their territory to extract concessions. Daniel Sharp (2025) argues that migration blackmail (under certain conditions) gives rise to a hard ethical dilemma, and that (under these conditions) target states should prioritise the interests of migrants over their own. This critical response argues that the Migration Blackmail Dilemma that Sharp has identified is even deeper than he presents it. This is because it forces policymakers to balance justice in migration against the risk of losing the office that enables them to pursue it.”